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Abstract
Crowdfunding provides the innovation that, before the investment, en-
trepreneurs contract with consumers. Under demand uncertainty, this improves
a screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard threatens this
benefit. Focusing on the trade-off between value screening and moral hazard,
the paper characterizes optimal mechanisms. Current crowdfunding schemes
reflect their salient features. Efficiency is sustainable only if returns exceed in-
vestment costs by a margin reflecting the degree of moral hazard. Constrained
efficient mechanisms exhibit underinvestment. Crowdfunding blurs the distinc-
tion between finance and marketing, but complements rather than substitutes
traditional entrepreneurial financing. As a screening tool for valuable projects,
crowdfunding unambiguously promotes social welfare.
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1 Introduction
Crowdfunding has, in recent years, attracted much attention as a new mode of en-
trepreneurial financing: through the internet many individuals — the crowd — pro-
vide funds directly to the entrepreneur.1 In the narrower context of reward crowd-
funding, this crowd consists of the very consumers whom the entrepreneur intends to
target with her product.
Hence, crowdfunding provides the economic innovation that, in contrast to tra-
ditional modes of financing, entrepreneurs can contract with their future consumers
already before the investment decision. Focusing on this ability, this paper argues that
crowdfunding leads to a more effective screening of valuable projects. The screening
benefit obtains, because the contract can condition the entrepreneur’s investment de-
cision on the consumers’ reports about their demand.2 Before illustrating this effect
in a concrete example, we first describe how reward crowdfunding works in practice.
The description clarifies the features by which crowdfunding schemes elicit consumers’
private information and thereby achieve a more effective screening of projects.
Attracting pledges of more than 2 billion dollars, the most successful crowdfunding
platform to date is Kickstarter.3 It implements crowdfunding as follows. First, the
entrepreneur describes her project, consisting of the following three elements: 1) a
description of the reward to the consumer, which is typically the entrepreneur’s final
product; 2) a “pledge level” p; and 3) a “target level” T . After describing these
elements, a number, say ñ, of consumers pledge contributions. If the sum of pledges
exceed the target level, i.e. if ñ ·p ≥ T , the entrepreneur receives the contribution
p from each of the ñ pledging consumers and in return delivers to each of them the
1Time Magazine (2010) lists crowdfunding as one of the “Best Inventions of 2010”, while The
Economist (2012) reports that the “talk of crowdfunding as a short-lived fad has largely ceased”.
On the policy side, the JOBS Act from 2012 and SEC (2015) are meant to boost crowdfunding in
the US by clarifying its legal and regulatory foundations. Even though the word “crowdfunding”
dates only from 2006, the practise itself goes back much further and has, for instance, been used in
the context of publishing.
2Also Ellman and Hurkens (2014) point out this conditioning feature of crowdfunding but, ab-
stracting from moral hazard and restricting to ad hoc mechanisms, focus on commitment effects
and potential benefits for price discrimination.
3See www.kickstarter.com and www.kickstarter.com/help/stats for statistics.
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promised reward. If the pledged contributions lie below the target level, ñ ·p < T ,
then the project is cancelled; consumers withdraw their pledges and the entrepreneur
has no obligations towards them. Hence, given a specified reward, the pair (p, T )
defines the crowdfunding scheme.
For an illustration of how a crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) screens for valuable
projects, consider a “crowd” of only a single representative consumer.4 Suppose
that the consumer’s willingness to pay for the good is either high, vh = 4, or low,
vl = 0, each with probability 1/2. Let I = 3 represent the development costs before
the good can be produced (with no further production costs). The project, therefore,
has a positive value of +1 in the state vh, a negative value −3 in the state vl and,
without observing the state v, the project has the negative value −1 in expectation.
Hence, even if the entrepreneur had the required cash, she would not invest
if she cannot learn the consumer’s valuation. A venture capitalist reviewing the
entrepreneur’s business plan faces the same problem. The crowdfunding scheme
(p, T ) = (4, 4), however, elicits the consumer’s private information naturally and
leads to an investment only in state vh. Indeed, facing the scheme (p, T ) = (4, 4),
only the consumer with a high value vh = 4 considers it optimal to pledge, and, hence,
the investment is triggered only in the high state. The scheme therefore induces an
efficient outcome and, moreover, allows the entrepreneur to extract the entire surplus.
The example not only illustrates the main efficiency effect of crowdfunding, but
also identifies the three ingredients that are crucial for generating it: 1) the presence
of fixed development costs; 2) uncertainty about whether the demand of consumers
is large enough to recover these costs; and 3) a trigger level that enables conditional
investment. The first two ingredients are defining features of entrepreneurial financ-
ing. The third ingredient is the defining feature of a so-called “all-or-nothing” reward
crowdfunding platform such as Kickstarter.5
4A single agent illustrates well the main efficiency property of crowdfunding. but hides its other
effective properties such as mitigating strategic uncertainty and coordination problems.
5Platforms using “all-or-nothing” pledge schemes are, for instance, Kickstarter, Sellaband, and
PledgeMusic. The “keep-what-you-raise” model, where pledges are triggered even if the target level
is not reached seem more popular for platforms that focus on non-profit projects (e.g. GoFundMe).
Kickstarter (www.kickstarter.com/help/stats) reports that less than 40% of the projects meet the
trigger level, which confirms that the trigger level plays a crucial role.
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Crowdfunding, however, also seems to exhibit an important economic disadvan-
tage as compared to more traditional modes of financing. More specifically, its re-
placement of financial intermediaries as investors by an uncoordinated crowd raises
important concerns about entrepreneurial moral hazard.6 Economic theory provides
clear efficiency arguments in favor of a specialized financial intermediary. In partic-
ular, Diamond (1984) points out that by coordinating investment through a single
financial intermediary, free-riding problems associated with monitoring the borrower’s
behavior are circumvented. Indeed, monitoring to limit moral hazard seems especially
important for entrepreneurial financing. Entrepreneurs are typically new players in
the market, who, in contrast to well-established firms, have not yet had the ability
to build up a reputation to demonstrate their trustworthiness.7
An analysis of crowdfunding without an explicit consideration of moral hazard
seems therefore lopsided. As it turns out, this is even more so, because the crowd-
funding scheme’s reduction in demand uncertainty interacts with the moral hazard
problem: an elimination of demand uncertainty intensifies moral hazard. Hence, in
the presence of both demand uncertainty and moral hazard, a non-trivial trade-off
concerning the informativeness of optimal mechanisms results.
Using the generalized mechanism design framework of Myerson (1982), we ex-
plicitly address this trade-off. More generally, we characterize mechanisms that op-
timally address the problem of both demand uncertainty and moral hazard. Myer-
son’s generalized framework assumes the presence of a mediator who coordinates the
communication between economic agents. One insight from our analysis is that the
crowdfunding platform plays exactly the role of a mediator in the sense of Myerson.
Next to this institutional insight, our characterization of optimal mechanisms
and their comparison to current crowdfunding platforms yield the following addi-
tional insights: 1) Optimal mechanisms reflect reward-based crowdfunding schemes
in that crowdfunders do not obtain a monetary return from funding the entrepreneur.
2) Optimal mechanisms reflect all-or-nothing reward crowdfunding schemes in that
they condition the entrepreneur’s investment decision on the sum of reported con-
6Mollick (2014) considers the funding of ventures “without standard financial intermediaries” as
a defining feature of crowdfunding, while Agrawal et al. (2014) stress moral hazard in crowdfunding.
7Footnotes 11 to 13 discuss actual cases of moral hazard in crowdfunding campaigns.
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sumer valuations. 3) Optimal mechanisms achieve first-best efficient outcomes only
if the ex ante expected returns of the project exceed the entrepreneur’s ex ante ex-
pected capital costs by a margin that is proportional to the threat of moral hazard.
4) Constrained efficient crowdfunding schemes display underinvestment and not over-
investment, which is consistent with an all-or-nothing reward crowdfunding scheme
with a target level that exceeds the entrepreneur’s investment costs. 5) Optimal
mechanisms defer payments to the entrepreneur in order to reduce the threat of
moral hazard, a feature which is reflected by some crowdfunding platforms such as
PledgeMusic.8 6) Optimal mechanisms resolve demand uncertainty only partially,
because the moral hazard problem interacts with the reduction in demand uncer-
tainty. Few crowdfunding schemes use deferred payments explicitly and none seem
to limit the entrepreneur’s information about demand uncertainty actively. This sug-
gests that current crowdfunding schemes deal with moral hazard suboptimally. Yet,
by considering an extension in which the mechanism is unable to reach all potential
consumers — which reflect current crowdfunding environments more appropriately,
we argue that current crowdfunding platforms use deferred payments implicitly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
related literature. Section 3 introduces the setup and takes an intuitive approach
that identifies the main trade-offs. Section 4 sets up the problem as one of mechanism
design. Section 5 characterizes (constrained) efficient mechanisms. Section 6 relates
optimal mechanisms to real-life crowdfunding mechanisms and examines extensions.
Section 7 concludes. All formal proofs are collected in the appendix.
2 Related literature
Being a relatively new phenomenon, the economic literature on crowdfunding is small
but growing. Concerning crowdfunding’s economic underpinnings, Agrawal et al.
(2014) highlight the main issues. They emphasize entrepreneurial moral hazard and
mention that crowdfunding can reduce demand uncertainty. Belleflamme et al. (2015)
survey current crowdfunding platforms and also point out the use of crowdfunding
8PledgeMusic explains the use of deferred payments to prevent fraud on its webpage http:
//www.pledgemusic.com/blog/220-preventing-fraud (last retrieved 2 November 2015.)
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“for market testing under uncertain aggregate demand.”
Focusing on price-discrimination, Cornelli (1996) considers a monopolistic firm
that, after an initial investment, faces privately informed consumers and characterizes
its optimal selling procedure. She explicitly shows that the actual composition of
aggregate contributions matters rather than the sum of aggregate contributions (see
also Barbieri and Malueg, 2010). As a result, crowdfunding schemes cannot deal with
the price-discrimination problem optimally. Belleflamme et. al (2014), Ellman and
Hurkens (2014), and Chang (2015), however, point out that, even though suboptimal,
crowdfunding schemes help firms to price discriminate consumers to some degree.
These paper subsequently identify the features of specific crowdfunding schemes that
are helpful in this respect.9
With respect to this literature, the current paper emphasizes that crowdfunding
schemes exhibit a crucial economic benefit unrelated to price discrimination. In
particular, this paper stresses the role of crowdfunding in “project-value screening”,
where the screening focuses on identifying differences in the aggregate valuation of
consumers, rather than its role in “consumer-specific-screening”, where the screening
focuses on identifying differences between the individual valuations of consumers and
which is the primary goal of price discrimination.
Identifying these two distinctive roles of crowdfunding is also crucial for properly
evaluating the welfare properties of crowdfunding schemes and addressing potential
regulatory questions: project-value screening univocally benefits both welfare and
consumers, whereas the use of crowdfunding as a tool for price discrimination has, at
best, ambiguous effects on welfare and consumers (e.g. Bergemann et. al. 2015).
While there is little work in economics and finance that focuses on the firm’s abil-
ity to screen for valuable projects by addressing consumers directly, the marketing
literature explicitly addresses this issue in its subfield of market research, focusing on
consumer surveys and product testing (e.g. Lauga and Ofek 2009). Ding (2007) how-
ever points out that marketing research relies on voluntary, non-incentivized reporting
by consumers. He emphasizes that consumers need to be given explicit incentives for
revealing their information truthfully. With respect to this literature, the current
9Also Hakenes and Schlegel (2015) restrict attention to specific crowdfunding schemes although
they do not focus on price discrimination but focus on costly information acquisition.
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paper clarifies that crowdfunding schemes provide explicit incentives for truthtelling
naturally.
Empirical studies of crowdfunding aim at identifying the crucial features of crowd-
funding projects. Studies such as Agrawal et al. (2011) and Mollick (2014) focus on
the geographic origin of consumers relative to the entrepreneur, while Kuppuswamy
and Bayus (2013) examine the role of social information for the project’s success.
Focusing on investment-based crowdfunding, Hildebrand, et al. (2013) identifies an
increased problem of moral hazard. Ordanini et al. (2011) present a marketing-based
case study on crowdfunding and also note that crowdfunding blurs the boundaries
between marketing and finance.
3 Crowdfunding and the Information Trade-off
This section introduces the framework. It considers an entrepreneur, who can, prior to
her investment decision, directly interact with privately informed consumers about
whether they value the product. We first model and discuss the role of demand
uncertainty, and subsequently introduce the problem of moral hazard.
The entrepreneur. We consider a penniless entrepreneur, who needs an upfront
investment of I > 0 from investors to develop her product. After developing it, the
entrepreneur can produce the good at some marginal cost c ∈ [0, 1). The entrepreneur
is crucial for realizing the project and cannot sell her idea to outsiders. We normalize
interest rates to zero.
The crowd. We consider a total of n consumers and denote a specific consumer
by the index i = 1, . . . , n. A consumer i either values the good, vi = 1, or not, vi =
0.10 Hence, the n-dimensional vector v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V ≡ {0, 1}n represents the
valuation profile of the consumers. We let π(v) denote its corresponding probability.





10The binary structure ensures that demand uncertainty expresses itself only concerning the ques-
tion whether the entrepreneur should invest without affecting actual pricing decisions. It clarifies
that the model’s driving force is not price discrimination. Section 6.4 discusses this in more detail.
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Since the marginal costs c are smaller than 1, we can take n1 as the potential demand
of the entrepreneur’s good. Its randomness expresses the demand uncertainty.
Investing without demand uncertainty. Consider as a benchmark the case
of perfect information, where the realized demand n1 is observable so that the invest-
ment decision can directly condition on it. It is socially optimal that the entrepreneur
invests if the project’s revenue, n1, covers the costs of production I + n1c, i.e. if








Pr{n1}[(1− c)n1 − I].
Note that by investing whenever n1 ≥ n̄ and, subsequently, selling the good at a price
p = 1, the entrepreneur can appropriate the full surplus. Given that the entrepreneur
obtains the funds, this behavior represents her optimal strategy. Anticipating the
entrepreneur’s optimal behavior, a competitive credit market is willing to lend the
amount I at the normalized interest rate of zero. Hence, perfect information yields
an efficient outcome.
Investing with demand uncertainty. Next consider the setup with demand
uncertainty, i.e. the entrepreneur must decide to invest I without knowing n1 if she
wants to sell the good at some price p. If she does invest, it clearly remains optimal








It is therefore profitable to invest only if Π̄ ≥ 0. Even though the price p = 1
does not leave any consumer rents, the entrepreneur’s decision to invest leads either
to under- or over-investment. For parameter constellations such that Π̄ < 0, the
entrepreneur will not invest and, hence, under-investment results (because the good
is not produced for any n1 > n̄, where it would be efficient to produce). For the
parameter constellation Π̄ ≥ 0, the entrepreneur does invest I, but this implies over-
investment (because she produces the good also when it turns out that n1 < n̄).
Crowdfunding. We next consider the case of demand uncertainty but with an
all-or-nothing reward-based crowdfunding scheme for consumers. This means that
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the entrepreneur commits to a contract pair (p, T ). As explained in the introduction,
its interpretation is that if at least T/p consumers make a pledge so that the total
amount of pledged funds, P , exceeds T , then the entrepreneur obtains P , invests,
and produces a good for each consumer who pledged. If the total amount of pledges
P falls short of T , then the pledges are not triggered and the entrepreneur does not
invest.
It is straightforward to see that crowdfunding enables the entrepreneur to extract
the maximum aggregate surplus S∗ and, thereby, achieve an efficient outcome. In-
deed, for any p ∈ (0, 1], it is optimal for the consumer to pledge p if and only if
v = 1. As a result, exactly n1 consumers sign up so that the sum of pledges equals
P = n1p. Hence, the project is triggered whenever T ≤ n1p. We conclude that the
crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) with p ∈ (0, 1] yields the entrepreneur an expected profit




Price p = 1 and target level T = n̄ maximize these profits, enabling the entrepreneur
to extract the associated expected surplus of S∗ and yielding an efficient outcome.
In comparison to the single consumer example of the introduction, it is worth-
while to point out two additional features of the crowdfunding scheme. First, even
without any active coordination between consumers, it circumvents any potential co-
ordination problems. This is because of the schemes second feature: it eliminates
any strategic uncertainty concerning both the behavior and the private information
of other consumers. In other words, the scheme’s conditional pledge system leads to
a game between the consumers, in which it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for each
individual consumer i to pledge if and only if vi = 1.
Moral hazard. The setup until now abstracted from any problems of moral
hazard. Consumers are sure to obtain the good as promised if their pledge is triggered.
In practice, consumers may however worry about whether the entrepreneur will in the
end deliver a good that meets the initial specifications, or whether they will receive
some good at all.
We capture the problem of moral hazard by assuming that, after the entrepreneur
obtains the money from the crowdfunding platform, she can “make a run” for it with
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a share α ∈ [0, 1]. When the entrepreneur “runs”, she does not incur any investment
or production costs and consumers do not obtain their valuable goods. The parameter
α measures the weakness of the institutional environment to prevent moral hazard.
For the extreme α = 0, there is effectively no moral hazard, whereas for the extreme,
α = 1, the principal can keep all the pledges without incurring any costs.
The entrepreneur’s “running” captures several types of moral hazard problems.
First, we can take the running literally: the entrepreneur is able to flee with the
share αP without being caught, or run with the amount P but with an expected
fine of (1− α)P .11 Second, at a reduced cost of (1− α)P < I − ñc the entrepreneur
can provide the consumer a product that matches the formal description but is still
worthless to the consumer.12 Third, by a (possibly expected) cost (1 − α)P , the
entrepreneur can convincingly claim that the project failed so that, without fearing
any legal repercussions, she need not deliver the product and keep the pledges.13
Considering the entrepreneur’s decision whether to run, note that she obtains a
profit P − I − cP/p from investing. An aggregated pledges of P , therefore, induces
the entrepreneur to run if
αP > P − I − cP/p. (1)
This holds not only for the extreme α = 1 but also for any α ≥ 1 − c/p. In these
cases, consumers rationally expect that the entrepreneur will not deliver the product
so that they will not be willing to participate in the crowdfunding scheme.
11E.g. the project “Code hero” raised $170,954 but never delivered its rewards, Polygon.com states
“His critics believe he has run off with the money raised from the kickstarter campaign” (http:
//www.polygon.com/2012/12/18/3781782/code-hero-kickstarter-interview , last retrieved 3
November 2015), whereas the Kickstarter campaign “Asylum Playing Cards” resulted in legal fines
“against a crowdfunded project that didn’t follow through on its promise to backers” (http://
www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-makes-crowdfunded-company-pay-shady-deal , last
retrieved 8 November 2015).
12E.g. the crowdfunding project “Healbe GoBe” on Indiegogo raised much controversy about
whether the delivered product actually works (see for instance http://blog.belgoat.com/
24-hours-with-my-healbe-gobe/ , last retrieved 8 November 2015).
13E.g. the guidelines on Kickstarter make consumers well-aware of this possibility: “If a creator is
making a good faith effort to complete their project and is transparent about it, backers should do
their best to be patient and understanding while demanding continued accountability from the cre-
ator.” (https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter%20basics#Acco , last retrieved 8
November 2015).
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In the remainder of this section, we introduce two intuitive but ad hoc changes
to the crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) that reduces entrepreneurial moral hazard. Using
a mechanism design approach, the next section proves that the two changes lead to
mechanisms that are indeed optimal in the class of all mechanisms.
An intuitive way to mitigate the moral hazard problem is to transfer the con-
sumer’s pledges to the entrepreneur only after having produced the good. Because
the penniless entrepreneur needs at least the amount I to develop the product, such
a delay in payments is possible only up to the amount I.
Hence, a first, ad hoc step towards mitigating the moral hazard problem is to
adjust the crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) and introduce deferred payments as follows.
As before, the price p represents the pledge level of an individual consumer and T the
target level which the sum of pledges, P , has to meet before the investment is trig-
gered. Different from before however, the entrepreneur, after learning P , first obtains
only the required amount I for developing the product and receives the remaining
part P − I only after delivering the good to consumers.
In order to characterize crowdfunding schemes with deferred payments that pre-
vent moral hazard, note that the entrepreneur now obtains only the payoff αI from
a run and the payoff P − I − cP/p from realizing the project. Hence, she has no
incentive to run if
αI ≤ P − I − cP/p⇒ P ≥ P̄ ≡ (1 + α)pI
p− c
. (2)
In particular, the deferred crowdfunding scheme with a pledge level of p = 1 and a
target T = (1 + α)I/(1 − c) does not induce any moral hazard. Given this scheme,
a consumer with value v = 1 is willing to pledge p = 1 and the scheme leads to
an equilibrium outcome in which all consumers with v = 1 pledge and the project
is triggered when at least T consumers have the willingness to pay of 1, i.e. if
n1 > (1 + α)I/(1 − c). Although the scheme does prevent moral hazard, it, for any
α > 0, does not attain the efficient outcome, because its target level is larger than
the socially efficient one; the scheme exhibits under-investment.
The information trade-off. We argued that a crowdfunding scheme with de-
ferred payments can circumvent the moral hazard problem. Since this deferred crowd-
funding scheme does not yield an efficient outcome, the question arises whether there
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are more sophisticated crowdfunding schemes that do better. To show that this is
indeed the case, note first that with respect to choosing the efficient investment deci-
sion, the entrepreneur only needs to learn whether n1 is above or below n̄. The exact
value of n1 is immaterial.
Yet, as inequality (2) reveals, the moral hazard problem intensifies if the en-
trepreneur obtains full information about P . As discussed, this inequality has to
hold for any possible realization of P ≥ T in order to prevent the entrepreneur from
running. Because the constraint is most stringent for P = T , a crowdfunding scheme
(p, T ) prevents moral hazard if and only if T ≥ P̄ .
In contrast, if the entrepreneur would only learn that P exceeds T , but not the
exact value of P itself, then she rationally anticipates an expected payoff
E[P |P ≥ T ]− I − cE[P |P ≥ T ]/p
from not running with the money. Since the conditional expectation E[P |P ≥ T ]
obviously exceeds T , a crowdfunding scheme that reveals only whether P exceeds T
can deal with the moral hazard problem more efficiently.
Hence, in the presence of both demand uncertainty and moral hazard, the in-
formation extraction problem becomes a sophisticated one, because the extraction
of demand information interacts with the moral hazard problem. As a result, one
neither wants too much nor too little information revelation.
The analysis up to now has been ad hoc. By starting with a simple crowdfund-
ing scheme that reflects all-or-nothing reward-crowdfunding schemes in practise and
adapting it in two way — introducing deferred payments and reducing its informa-
tiveness — we improved its efficiency properties. The ad hoc nature of these two
changes, raises the question whether even more efficient crowdfunding mechanisms
exist.
In order to study this question, the next section first sets up the crowdfunding
problem as one of optimal mechanism design. It subsequently formally proves that
the payout-deferred and information-restricted reward crowdfunding scheme (p, T )
towards which we argued intuitively is indeed optimal in the class of all mechanisms.
In other words, such crowdfunding schemes are an indirect implementation of the
optimal direct mechanism.
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4 Crowdfunding and Mechanism Design
In this section we cast the entrepreneur’s economic problem into a problem of mecha-
nism design and characterize optimal mechanisms. In order to treat the entrepreneur’s
moral hazard, we use the framework of Myerson (1982), which handles both unobserv-
able information and unobservable actions. This generalized framework introduces
a mediator, who coordinates the communication between economic agents and gives
incentive compatible recommendations concerning the unobservable actions that lead
to moral hazard. One of the insights from this analysis is that crowdfunding plat-
forms play exactly the role of a mediator in the sense of Myerson (1982). The section’s
main result is to confirm formally that the payout-deferred and information-restricted
reward crowdfunding scheme as identified in the previous section is a (constrained)
efficient mechanism.
Economic Allocations. In order to cast the entrepreneur’s investment prob-
lem in a framework of mechanism design, we first make precise the feasible eco-
nomic allocations: Crowdfunding seeks to implement an allocation between one
cash-constrained entrepreneur, player 0, and n consumers, players 1 to n. It in-
volves monetary transfers and production decisions. Concerning monetary transfers,
consumers can make transfers to the entrepreneur both before and after the en-
trepreneur’s investment decision. We denote the ex ante transfer from consumer i
to the entrepreneur by tai and the ex post transfer by t
p
i . Concerning the production
decisions, the allocation describes whether the entrepreneur invests, x0 = 1, or not,
x0 = 0, and whether the entrepreneur produces a good for consumer i, xi = 1, or not,
xi = 0. Consequently, an economic allocation is a collection a = (t, x) of transfers




1, . . . , t
p
n) ∈ R2n and outputs x = (x0, . . . , xn) ∈ X ≡ {0, 1}n+1.
Feasible Allocations. By the very nature of the crowdfunding problem, the
entrepreneur does not have the resources to finance the required investment I > 0.
The entrepreneur’s financial constraints imply the following restrictions on feasible
allocations. First, if the entrepreneur invests (x0 = 1), the transfers of the consumers
must be enough to cover the investment costs I. Moreover, the entrepreneur can not
make any net positive ex ante transfers to consumers if she does not invest (x0 = 0).
Second, aggregate payments must be enough to cover the entrepreneur’s investment
13
and production costs. To express these two feasibility requirements, we say that an
allocation a = (t, x) is budget-feasible if
n∑
i=1









In addition, an entrepreneur can only produce a good to a consumer if she developed
it. To express this feasibility requirement, we say that an allocation a = (t, x) is
development feasible if, whenever the good is produced for at least one consumer, the
entrepreneur invested in its development:
∃i : xi = 1⇒ x0 = 1. (4)
This condition logically implies that if x0 = 0 then xi = 0 for all i.
Let the set A ⊂ R2n×{0, 1}n+1 denote the set of budget- and development-feasible
allocations, i.e. allocations that satisfy (3) and (4).
Payoffs. Let the n-dimensional vector v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V ≡ {0, 1}n represent
the valuation profile of the consumers. We denote the probability of v ∈ V by π(v)
and the conditional probability of v−i ∈ V−1 ≡ {0, 1}n−1 given vi as πi(v−i|vi). As-
suming that individual types are drawn independently, it holds πi(v−i|0) = πi(v−i|1)
so that we can express the conditional probability simply as πi(v−i). Moreover, we
assume that consumers are identical: πi(v−k) = πj(v−k) for any v−k ∈ V−1 and i, j.
A feasible allocation a ∈ A yields a consumer i with value vi the payoff
Ui(a|vi) = vixi − tai − t
p
i ;






i )− c ·
n∑
i=1
xi − Ix0 ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows directly from the second inequality in (3), implying that
any feasible allocation yields the entrepreneur a non-negative payoff.
Efficiency. An output schedule x ∈ X is Pareto efficient in state v if and only if
it maximizes the aggregate net surplus






(vi − c)xi − Ix0.
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With respect to efficiency, two different types of production decisions matter: the
overall investment decision x0 and the individual production decisions xi. Given
vl = 0 < c < vh = 1, efficiency with respect to the individual allocations requires
xi = vi. This yields a surplus of
∑




;V 0 ≡ {v :
∑
i
v < n̄};V 1 ≡ {v :
∑
i




we can fully characterize the Pareto efficient output schedule x∗(v) as follows. For
v ∈ V 0, it exhibits x∗0 = x∗i = 0 for all i. For v ∈ V 1, it exhibits x∗0 = 1 and x∗i = vi for
all i.14 Under an efficient output schedule, the entrepreneur invests only if v ∈ V 1,
implying that π∗ expresses the ex ante probability that the project is executed.
Although transfers are immaterial for Pareto efficiency, we must nevertheless en-
sure that the efficient output schedule x∗(v) can indeed be made part of some feasible
allocation a ∈ A. In order to specify one such feasible allocation, we define the first
best allocation a∗(v) as follows. For v ∈ V 1, it exhibits xi = tai = vi = 1 and t
p
i = 0.
For v ∈ V 0, a∗(v) is defined by xi = tai = xi = tai = t
p
i = 0. By construction a
∗(v)








We further say that an output schedule x : V → X is development efficient if
x0(v) = 1⇒ ∃i : xi(v) = 1. (6)
This condition is the converse of development feasibility (4). If it does not hold, it
implies the inefficiency that there is a state v in which the entrepreneur invests I but
no consumer consumes the good. Although technically feasible, a schedule that is
not development efficient is not Pareto efficient, since it wastes the investment I > 0.
For future reference, the following lemma summarizes these considerations.
Lemma 1 The first best allocation a∗(v) is feasible and exhibits an output schedule
that is development efficient. It yields an expected net surplus of W ∗ − π∗I.
14For
∑




i = 0 is also efficient, but this is immaterial (and can
only arise for the non-generic case that I is a multiple of 1− c).
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Mechanisms. We next turn to mechanisms. A mechanism Γ is a set of rules
between the entrepreneur and the n consumers that induces a game. Its outcome is
an allocation a ∈ A with payoffs Π(a) and Ui(a|vi). In line with Myerson (1982),
we interpret the crowdfunding platform as the mediator, who runs the mechanism;
it credibly commits to enforce the rules of the game which the mechanism specifies,
and it coordinates the communication between participants.
At the end of Section 3, we considered one such mechanism: the payout-deferred,
information restricted, all-or-nothing reward-crowdfunding scheme ΓCF = (p, T ).
This mechanism induces the following game between the entrepreneur and consumers
enforced by the crowdfunding platform: Each consumer i sends to the platform a
confidential binary message mi ∈ {0, 1}. If
∑
imip < T , the platform enforces the
allocation tai = t
p
i = xi = x0 = 0. If
∑
imip ≥ T , the platform enforces the ex
ante payments tai = I/
∑
imi. In case the entrepreneur does not run, it subsequently
enforces outputs xi = mi and transfers t
p
i = p − tai . In case the entrepreneur runs,
the platform enforces outputs xi = 0 and transfers t
p
i = 0.
The main task of this section is to demonstrate that this type of mechanism is
indeed optimal. In order to do so, it is common to first introduce a different class of
mechanisms: direct mechanisms.
A direct mechanism is a function γ : V → A, which induces the following game.15
First, consumers simultaneously and independently send a (confidential) report vri
about their values to the platform. Based on the collected reports vr and in line with





r) from the consumers and
transfers them to the entrepreneur together with the recommendation x0(v
r) about
whether to invest I. To capture the moral hazard problem, we explicitly assume that
the platform cannot coerce the entrepreneur into following the recommendation x0 =
1. That is, the entrepreneur is free to follow or reject it. If, however, the entrepreneur
follows the recommendation, the platform enforces the production schedule x(vr) =
(x1(v
r), . . . , xn(v
r)) and the transfers tpi (v
r). If the entrepreneur does not follow the
recommendation to invest, but runs, then individual production schedules are 0, and
no ex post transfers flow, i.e. xi = t
p
i = 0. Moreover, consumers forfeit their ex ante
15Hence, we study the extreme where the entrepreneur contracts with all n consumers. In section
6.2 we address extensions where the mechanism can reach only a subset of all consumers.
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transfers tai .
A direct mechanism γ is incentive compatible if its induced game as described
above has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which 1) consumers are truthful in that
they reveal their values honestly, i.e. vri = vi, and 2) the entrepreneur is obedient in
that she follows the recommendation, i.e. x0 = x0(v
r).









(tai (vi, v−i) + t
p
i (vi, v−i))πi(v−i).
Consequently, we say that a direct mechanism γ is truthful if
viXi(vi)− Ti(vi) ≥ viXi(v′i)− Ti(v′i) for all i ∈ I and vi, v′i ∈ Vi. (7)
To formalize the notion of obedience, we define for a direct mechanism γ the set
T a as the set of possible aggregate ex ante transfers which the mechanism can induce
conditional on recommending investment:
T a ≡ {T a|∃v ∈ V :
n∑
i=1
tai (v) = T
a ∧ x0(v) = 1}.
Given this set we define for any T a ∈ T a the set V (T a) which comprises all states
that induce a recommendation to invest together with a total transfer T a:
V (T a) ≡ {v ∈ V |x0(v) = 1 ∧
∑
i
tai (v) = T
a}.
Upon receiving a recommendation to invest, the entrepreneur has received some







if v ∈ V (T a);
0 otherwise.
With this notation, we say that a direct mechanism γ is obedient if for any T a ∈ T a
and after obtaining the recommendation to invest, x0 = 1, the entrepreneur is better




π(v|T a)(tpi (v)− cxi(v)) + T a − I ≥ αT a, for all T a ∈ T a. (8)
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We say that a direct mechanism is incentive compatible if and only if it is truthful
and obedient.
By its nature, participation in the crowdfunding mechanism is voluntary so that it
must yield the consumers and the entrepreneur at least their outside option. Taking
these outside options as 0, the entrepreneur’s participation is not an issue, because,
as argued, any feasible allocation yields the entrepreneur a non-negative payoff. In
contrast, a consumer’s participation in an incentive compatible direct mechanism is
individual rational only if
viXi(vi)− Ti(vi) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I and vi ∈ Vi. (9)
To summarize, we say that a direct mechanism γ is feasible, if it is incentive
compatible and individual rational for each consumer.16 A feasible direct mechanism
yields consumer i with valuation vi the utility
Ui(vi) ≡ viXi(vi)− Ti(vi); (10)





Finally, we say that two feasible direct mechanisms γ = (t, x) and γ′ = (t′, x′) are






′(v), vi), ∀i, vi;






Implementability. An allocation function f : V → A specifies for any value
profile v an allocation a ∈ A. It is implementable if there exists a mechanism Γ
16This implicitly assumes that the mechanism has “perfect consumer reach” in that every con-
sumer is aware and can participate in the mechanism. As an extension that yields important
additional insights, Subsection 6.2 studies the effect of imperfect consumer reach.
18
such that the induced game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome in which
the induced allocation coincides with f(v) for every v ∈ V . In this case, we say Γ
implements f .
Likewise, an output schedule x : V → X specifies for any value profile v an
output schedule x ∈ X. It is implementable if there exists a mechanism Γ such that
the induced game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome in which the induced
output coincides with x(v) for every v ∈ V . In this case, we say Γ implements output
schedule x(·).
By the revelation principle, an allocation function f(·) is implementable if and only
if there exists a feasible direct mechanism γ with γ(v) = f(v) for any v ∈ V . Likewise,
an output schedule x(·) is implementable if and only if there exists a direct mechanism
γ = (xγ, tγ) such that xγ(v) = x(v) for any v ∈ V . Hence, as usual, the revelation
principle motivates incentive compatibility as one of the defining requirements of
feasibility. A first question that arises is whether an efficient output schedule is always
implementable. Considering a specific version of the model, the next proposition
demonstrates that this is not the case:
Proposition 1 For I = n − 1/2, α = 1, and c = 0, the efficient output schedule
x∗(v) is not implementable.
The proposition implies that, in general, the efficient output is not implementable.
The main driver behind this inefficiency result is a tension between the entrepreneur’s
budget constraint and the moral hazard problem. For consumers to make sure that
the entrepreneur realizes her project, it does not suffice to give her simply the required
amount I to invest. Due to the moral hazard problem, she must also be given an
incentive to actually invest this money. The proposition shows that for the efficient
output schedule x∗ this is, in general, not possible.
The proposition raises questions about which output schedules are generally im-
plementable and about the conditions under which the efficient schedule is imple-
mentable. To answer these questions we investigate the mechanism design problem
further. The following lemma shows that with respect to development-efficient allo-
cations, we may reduce the class of feasible direct mechanisms further.
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Lemma 2 If γ = (t, x) is feasible and x is development-efficient then there is a
feasible and payoff equivalent direct mechanism γ̂ = (t̂, x) with∑
i
t̂ai (v) = Ix0(v),∀v ∈ V. (12)
The lemma implies that with respect to development-efficient mechanisms there
is no loss of generality in restricting attention to feasible direct mechanisms that give
the entrepreneur exactly the amount I if the entrepreneur is to develop the product.
The lemma therefore makes precise the suggestion of the previous section that a
mechanism should provide the entrepreneur with the minimal amount of information
for reducing demand uncertainty; effectively, she should only be told that the demand
of consumers ensures that the project has a positive NPV, but not more. The main
step in proving this result is to show that obedience remains satisfied when we replace
different aggregate levels of ex ante payments by a single one.17
The lemma simplifies the mechanism design problem in two respects. First, under
condition (12), condition (3) reduces to
n∑
i=1




Second, under condition (12), we have T a = {I} so that the obedience constraint (8)




π(v|I)(tpi (v)− cxi(v)) ≥ αI. (14)
5 (Constrained) efficient mechanisms
In this section we characterize second best mechanisms γsb = (xsb, tsb) that maximize
aggregate surplus in the presence of demand uncertainty and moral hazard. We are
especially interested in determining the circumstances under which these second best
mechanisms do not implement the efficient output schedule x∗.









(vi − c)xi(v)− Ix0(v)
]
. (15)
17The lemma fails for development-inefficient mechanisms so that we cannot dispense with the
restriction to development-efficient mechanisms.
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Clearly γsb cannot yield more than W ∗ − π∗I, which is generated under the efficient
output schedule x∗. Indeed, Proposition 1 showed that, in general, γsb achieves
strictly less.
As γsb is necessarily development-efficient, we can find it by maximizing (15) sub-
ject to the constraints (7), (9), (12), (13), and (14), because these constraints char-
acterize the set of implementable allocation functions that are development-efficient.
The maximization problem yields the following partial characterization of γsb:
Lemma 3 The individual rationality constraint of consumers with the high value
vi = 1 does not restrict the second best mechanism γ
sb. The second best mechanism
exhibits xi(0, v−i) = Xi(0) = Ti(0) = 0, and Ti(1) = Xi(1) for all i = 1, . . . , n.
It follows from the previous lemma that the second best mechanism γsb is a









(vi − c)xi(v)− Ix0(v)
]




π(v|I)(tpi (v)− cxi(v)) ≥ αI; (17)
Ti(0) = 0 for all i; (18)
n∑
i=1







xi(v) = 1⇒ x0(v) = 1; (21)
xi(0, v−i) = 0,∀v−i ∈ V−i. (22)
Recalling that π∗ represents the ex ante probability that the project is executed
under the efficient schedule x∗, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 The efficient output schedule x∗ is implementable if and only if W ∗ ≥
W̄α ≡ (1 + α)π∗I. If implementable, the indirect payout-deferred, information-
restricted, all-or-nothing reward-crowdfunding scheme Γ̄CF = (p̄, T̄ ) with p̄ ≡ 1 and
T̄ ≡ I/(1− c) implements x∗.
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Proposition 2 makes precise the parameter constellation under which the first best
x∗ is implementable: only if the efficient production schedule x∗ generates a surplus
that exceeds the ex ante expected investment costs (1 + α) times. For values of W ∗
in between π∗I and (1 + α)π∗I, the optimal mechanism exhibit inefficiencies.
Intuitively, the driver behind these inefficiencies is a tension between the en-
trepreneur’s budget constraint and her moral hazard problem. For consumers to
make sure that the entrepreneur realizes her project, it does not suffice to give her
simply the required amount I to invest. Due to the moral hazard problem, she must
also be given an incentive to actually invest this money. As the proposition shows, this
effectively requires consumers to pay the entrepreneur the run-away payoff αI. The
project is therefore only worthwhile if the project’s revenue recovers the augmented
investment cost (1 + α)I.
Effectively, the proposition shows that the combination of the entrepreneur’s bud-
get constraint and her moral hazard problem increases investment costs by a factor
α. It prevents first best outcomes if the expected gross surplus W ∗ is too small.
Whenever the ex ante gross surplus does not exceed the expected investment costs
by the factor α, the efficient output schedule, x∗, is not implementable so that the
second best output schedule xsb does not coincide with x∗. We next characterize both
the second best and the type of inefficiencies it exhibits.
Proposition 3 For W ∗ < W̄α, the constrained efficient output schedule xsb exhibits
i) xsbi (v) = vi whenever x
sb
0 (v) = 1; ii) x
sb
0 (v) = 0 whenever x
∗
0(v) = 0; and iii)
xsb0 (v) = 1 whenever
∑
vi > (1 +α)I/(1− c). Moreover, an indirect payout-deferred,
information restricted, all-or-nothing reward-crowdfunding scheme ΓCF = (p, T ) im-
plements xsb.
The first part of the proposition shows that the constrained efficient output sched-
ules are only distorted with respect to the investment decision but not to the indi-
vidual assignments. The second part of the proposition shows that the second best
output schedule is distorted downwards rather than upwards. The third part shows
that at most the allocations for which aggregate valuations lie in the range between
W ∗ and W̄α are downward distorted. This final statement also implies that for the
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constrained efficient output schedule it matters only whether the sum of valuations
exceed a target level T . As a result, the second best scheme can be implemented
indirectly by a crowdfunding scheme (1, T ).
6 Interpretation and Discussion
This section interprets the optimal direct mechanism as derived in the previous section
and relates it to crowdfunding platforms in practise. It further discusses extensions
and robustness of the results.
6.1 Comparison to current crowdfunding platforms
Relating our theoretical results to current crowdfunding platforms, our first obser-
vation concerns the role of the crowdfunding platform itself. In our formal analysis
the platforms structures the communication between entrepreneur and consumers,
and executes the mechanism. We note that this is fully in line with the role that
crowdfunding platforms play in practise. Platforms such as Kickstarter emphasize
that they are not involved in the development of the projects themselves and take
no responsibility in guaranteeing the entrepreneur’s project.18 Wikipedia therefore
calls the platform “a moderating organization”. Tellingly, the technical term of the
platform’s role in (extended) mechanism design is “mediator” (e.g. Myerson 1982).
Although the platform’s role seems only minor, it is nevertheless crucial. Due to
commitment problems, it cannot be performed by either the entrepreneur or the
consumers.
A second notable feature of optimal direct mechanisms is that they explicitly
condition the entrepreneur’s investment decision on the sum of reported valuations
rather than each consumer’s report individually. This is consistent with the many
“all-or-nothing” pledge schemes of popular reward crowdfunding platforms such as
Kickstarter. In other words, these schemes are indirect mechanisms that implement
the conditional investment.
18See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowdfunding and https://www.kickstarter.com/
help/faq/kickstarter%20basics#Acco for explaining the limited involvement of Kickstarter, last
retrieved 8 November 2015.
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A third feature of optimal direct mechanisms is that they do not exhibit negative
transfers. Hence, at no point in time the entrepreneur needs to pay consumers any
money. In particular, she does not share her revenue after the investment: tpi (v) ≥
0. Consequently, optimal mechanisms do not turn consumers into investors; the
optimal crowdfunding scheme is not investment-based. This feature is consistent
with current reward crowdfunding: a crowdfunding consumer receives only a non-
monetary reward for his pledged contribution. Reward-crowdfunding schemes such
as Kickstarter explicitly prohibit any monetary transfers to crowdfunders.19,20
A fourth feature of optimal direct mechanisms is a deferred payout to prevent
moral hazard. Some but definitely not all crowdfunding platforms do so. For in-
stance, PledgeMusic, a crowdfunding platform specialized in raising money for music
recordings, uses deferred payouts to prevent fraud.21
A final notable feature of optimal direct mechanisms is that they provide only
information about whether the sum of pledges exceeds the target and not the total
sum of pledges itself. In line with Lemma 2 any additional information is not needed
to implement (constrained) efficient outcomes, and schemes that provide more infor-
mation may exacerbate the moral hazard problem. Current crowdfunding platforms
do not reflect this feature. Currently all crowdfunding platforms are fully transpar-
ent and announce publicly the total amount of pledges rather than just whether the
target level was reached.
To summarize, current all-or-nothing reward crowdfunding platforms reflect many
crucial features of the optimal mechanisms underlying our theoretical model. They,
however, do not seem to deal with moral hazard optimally. The next section addresses
especially this latter point.
6.2 Limited Consumer Reach
The previous section suggests that current crowdfunding schemes deal with moral
hazard suboptimally. In particular, they rarely use deferred payments, which, as
shown by PledgeMusic, seems relatively straightforward to implement. On the other
19See https://www.kickstarter.com/rules?ref=footer, last retrieved 22 July 2015.
20The next section argues however that a limited reach of the platform results in crowd-investment.
21See http://www.pledgemusic.com/blog/220-preventing-fraud , last retrieved 20 July 2015.
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hand, there seems nevertheless little indication that in practise fraud is a prevalent
problem in crowdfunding. Mollick (2013), for instance, reports that fraudulent fail-
ures for Kickstarter projects are very rare (well below 5%).
Since crowdfunding platforms currently reach only a very small part of potential
demand, this section argues that even though crowdfunding schemes do not use de-
ferred payout explicitly, they do so implicitly. The argument is that the entrepreneur’s
prospect to sell her products to consumers who did not participate in crowdfunding
acts as a direct substitute for deferred payments.22
Motivated by the observation that crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to contract
with consumers before their investment, our formal analysis took this idea to the
extreme and implicitly assumed that the entrepreneur could contract with every po-
tential consumer. Given this extreme position, the revelation principle implies that
there is indeed no loss of generality in assuming that mechanisms allow consumers
to acquire the product only through the mechanism. This evidently changes when,
for some exogenous reason, not all consumers can participate in the mechanism. In
practise this is a highly relevant concern, because a share of consumers may fail to
notice the crowdfunding scheme, not have access to the internet, or only arrive in
the market after the product has been developed. Hence, a relevant extension of our
framework is to consider mechanisms, which, for some exogenous reason, have an
imperfect consumer-reach.
In order to make this more concrete, consider an extension of the model in which
only a share of β ∈ (0, 1) can partake in the mechanism. Already the pure propor-
tional case that a consumer’s ability to participate is independent of his valuation,
yields new important insights.
Note first that for this pure proportional case, the crowdfunding scheme is still
able to elicit the project’s value: a pledge by ñ consumers means that the project is
worth n1 = ñ/β. Consequently, investment is efficient if and only if
ñ/β ≥ I/(1− c)⇒ ñ ≥ n̄(β) ≡ βI/(1− c).
It is straightforward to see that the previous analysis still applies when we factor in β.
22Interestingly, this may not be the case for very specialized crowdfunding platforms such as
PledgeMusic, who do use explicit deferred payout systems.
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In particular, the efficient output scheme is implementable for W ∗ ≥ (1 + α)π∗Iβ.23
In order to see that, with limited consumer reach, a classic reward crowdfunding
scheme (p, T ) without deferred payments can withstand moral hazard even for the
extreme case α = 1, note that when only a share of β potential consumers can be
reached, inequality (1), which describes the condition under which the entrepreneur
has a strict incentive to run, changes to
αP > P/β − I − cP/(pβ)⇒ β > β̄ ≡ 1− c/p
α + I/P
. (23)
Hence, whereas, under full consumer reach (β = 1), a reward crowdfunding scheme
(p, T ) without deferred payments is unable to withstand moral hazard whenever
α > 1 − c/p − I/P , it does withstand moral hazard when its consumer reach is
limited to β < β̄. The reason for this follows the logic behind deferred payments: the
limited consumer reach effectively implies that a pledge level P constitutes a deferred
payment of P/β − P > 0.
Apart from reducing the threat of moral hazard, the extension reveals an impor-
tant additional economic effect: consumers may become actual investors when the
share of crowdfunding consumers β is small. To see this, note that, because the en-
trepreneur needs the amount I to develop the product, the (average) ex ante transfer
of a pledging consumer needs to be at least I/ñ. When β is small in the sense that
n̄(β) is smaller than 1, it follows that for ñ close to n̄(β), the consumer’s ex ante
transfer exceeds his willingness to pay. Individual rationality then implies that the
ex post transfer to the consumer is negative. Hence, the optimal mechanism turns
consumers in investors; they finance the entrepreneur’s investment and share in her
revenues.
As noted, reward crowdfunding schemes such as Kickstarter explicitly prohibit
monetary transfers to crowdfunders. Our formal analysis confirms that this is indeed
not needed if the investment I is small compared to the number of crowdfunding
consumers, but for large investments such restrictions may matter.24
23This “proportionality” property holds because the derived efficient scheme extracts all rents
from consumers and the entrepreneur can implement the efficient outcome by using the scheme as
derived and set a price p = 1 to the (1−β)n consumers who can only participate after the good has
been developed.
24Ordanini et al. (2011) report the case of Cameesa, a Chicago based clothing company
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Finally note that all-or-nothing crowdfunding schemes also give consumers a strict
incentive to participate in the crowdfunding scheme, even if they have the option to
wait and buy the product later in the after market. This is so, because a consumer
may be pivotal for the entrepreneur’s decision whether to produce the good. Hence,
facing a crowdfunding scheme (p, T ) a consumer is strictly better off participating
(provided that he expects that the after market price is not lowered, which in our
model would indeed not be the case). Hence, next to eliciting the consumer’s valua-
tion in an incentive compatible manner, crowdfunding schemes also exhibit features,
which support the incentive compatibility of participation.25
6.3 Entrepreneur’s private cost information
Both the first best and the optimal (constrained) efficient mechanism condition on
the entrepreneur’s investment cost I and marginal cost c. The optimal mechanism,
therefore, exploits the assumption that costs are public information. In practise, one
may worry that the entrepreneur is better informed about these costs than consumers.
In this case, the costs become the entrepreneur’s private information so that if the
mechanism is to condition on this information, it must incentivize the entrepreneur
to reveal it. This may potentially lead to new distortions.
Note that because the optimal mechanism implements an allocation in which
the entrepreneur obtains all the rents, one might be tempted to argue that the
entrepreneur’s incentives are fully aligned with social welfare so that the mecha-
nism automatically gives her the proper incentives to reveal her private information
truthfully. This reasoning is however incomplete, because it only considers a unilat-
eral deviation. Hence, even though the reasoning implies that a single deviation to
misreport costs is not profitable, the combined deviation of misreporting costs and,
which in 2008 introduced an “all-or-nothing” crowdfunding model, but also shared revenue
with its crowdfunders. Supporters of a successful project not only obtained the shirt, but
also shared in some of the revenue of its future sales. (see http://www.cnet.com/news/
cameesa-a-threadless-where-customers-are-also-investors/, last retrieved 22 July 2015).
25Next to the probability to be pivotal and the consumer’s expectation of the price in the af-
ter market, a consumer’s specific incentives to participate will also depend on other factors from
which our model abstracts: time-preferences, the probability that the project will succeed, and the
possibility that the consumer can better judge the product after it has been successfully produced.
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subsequently, running away with the money run may be profitable. Therefore, the
crowdfunding scheme Γ̄CF implements the first best with private information about
costs only if W ∗ ≥ W̄α and a combined deviation is not profitable.
To examine the implications of this in closer detail, suppose that W ∗ ≥ W̄α so
that, under the assumption that I and c are public information, the efficient output
x∗ is implementable by the scheme Γ̄CF . Now first assume that only c is private
information. It is then straightforward to show that, the scheme Γ̄CF automatically
induces the entrepreneur to report c truthfully, provided that she does not run away.
In order to see that Γ̄CF does not imply an incentive compatibility with respect to the
combined deviation of misreporting and running away, define π̄(T ) as the probability







Now suppose the platform offers the scheme Γ̄CF with the target T̄ = I/(1− c), but,
not observing c, asks the entrepreneur to report it before implementing the scheme.
Instead of reporting truthfully and obtain the gross revenueW ∗, the strategy to report
cr and subsequently run away yields the entrepreneur απ̄(I/(1−cr))I. Hence, the best
deviation for the entrepreneur is to report cr = 0 and subsequently run away with the
payment I, yielding the deviation payoff απ̄(I)I. With private information about the
cost c, the scheme Γ̄CF therefore withstands moral hazard only if W ∗−π∗I ≥ απ̄(I)I,
whereas, with public information about the cost c, it withstands moral hazard for
W ∗−π∗I ≥ απ∗I. Since π∗ = π̄(I/(1−c)) ≤ π̄(I), the moral hazard constraint when
c is private information is stricter. This reasoning leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Suppose I is public information, whereas c is the entrepreneur’s private
information. Then the crowdfunding contact Γ̄CF implements the efficient output
schedule x∗ if and only if W ∗ ≥ (π∗ + απ̄(I))I.
A comparison of the lemma to Proposition 2 reveals that with private information
about c, the efficient output is more difficult to implement when c is private informa-
tion. The intuition for this result is that by reporting a lower cost c, the entrepreneur
can raise the probability that the project is financed and this increases the threat of
moral hazard.
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It is straightforward to extend the previous reasoning to the case when also I is
private information. In this case, an implementation of Γ̄CF requires the entrepreneur
to report both the investment cost I and the marginal costs c. Again, misreporting
(I, c) does not lead to a higher payoff if the entrepreneur does not run, while reporting
(Ir, cr) and subsequently running away yields the pay π̄(Ir)Ir. Defining
Î = arg max
Ir
π̄(Ir)Ir,
the maximum deviation payoff is απ̄(Î)Î. Hence, the scheme Γ̄CF withstands moral
hazard if W ∗ − π∗I ≥ απ̄(Î)Î. The reasoning leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose (I, c) are the entrepreneur’s private information. Then the
crowdfunding contact Γ̄CF implements the efficient output schedule x∗ if and only if
W ∗ ≥ π∗I + απ̄(Î)Î.
The proposition shows that the entrepreneur’s private information about costs
does not affect our main qualitative results. In particular, both the result that effi-
ciency is implementable when the ex ante gross surplus W ∗ is large enough and the
result that moral hazard effectively implies a mark-up on the investment costs still
hold. Note also that if there is no moral hazard (α = 0), then private information
about costs does not affect the optimal crowdfunding mechanism at all. Hence, pri-
vate information about costs only affect outcomes to the extent that it intensifies the
moral hazard problem proportionally.
6.4 Crowdfunding and price discrimination
In our formal analysis, we assumed that consumers either do not value the good
(v = vl = 0) or value it at the same positive amount (v = vh = 1). We stress that
this assumption should not be understood as a simplifying one, but as one that, by
contrasting it to the existing literature, allows us to identify different strengths and
weaknesses of crowdfunding schemes.
To make this more precise, note that a defining features of a crowdfunding scheme
(p, T ) is that it conditions the investment decision on the sum of pledges. Cornelli
(1996, p.18), however, explicitly shows that, for achieving optimal price discrimi-
nation, the actual composition of this sum rather than the sum itself matters. As
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a result, crowdfunding schemes cannot deal with the price-discrimination problem
optimally (see also Barbieri and Malueg 2010). In contrast, our results show that,
even in the presence of entrepreneurial moral hazard, conditioning on the sum of
pledges is optimal when eliciting the overall value of the project does not require
price discrimination.
Hence, by restriction to our binary consumer valuations and comparing our results
to the earlier literature, we are able to identify two different economic effects of crowd-
funding and compare the ability of crowdfunding to take advantage of them: whereas
crowdfunding schemes are optimal tools for “project-value screening”, where the ag-
gregate valuation of consumers matters, they are suboptimal tools for “consumer-
specific-screening’’, which is a defining feature of price discrimination.
The distinction between the two modes of screening is also important for eval-
uating the welfare effects of crowdfunding: project-value screening unambiguously
benefits welfare and consumers, whereas the welfare properties of consumer-specific-
screening as a tool for price discrimination are, as is well-known, ambiguous.
In practise however the two screening modes are tightly connected and it is there-
fore hard to isolate them empirically. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that the
current crowdfunding schemes are also used for price-discrimination.26 Moreover, cur-
rent crowdfunding platforms offer extensive evaluation tools that enable entrepreneurs
to obtain much more information than just whether there is enough demand for cov-
ering the costs of the project. We however point out that if the main role of the
schemes is to provide a tool of price-discrimination, then one should expect schemes
which do not condition the project on the sum of pledges.
6.5 Crowdfunding vs. Venture Capitalists
By enabling direct interactions with consumers before the investment, crowdfund-
ing leads to a transformation of the entrepreneurial business model. Ordanini et al.
(2011) emphasize that the transformation takes place at a fundamental level, blur-
26E.g. The Economist (2010) reports the concrete example of a book publisher planning to fund
a renewed publication of a sold-out book: “his efforts to tease out lenders’ price sensitivity from
previous Kickstarter projects showed that a $50 contribution was the most popular amount. It also










Figure 1: Traditional entrepreneurial financing (left) vs. reward crowdfunding (right)
ring the traditional separation of finance and marketing.27 Figure 1 illustrates this
transformation. In the traditional model, venture capitalists (or banks) attract cap-
ital from consumers to finance entrepreneurs, who subsequently use this capital to
produce goods and market them to consumers. In this traditional model, finance
and marketing are naturally separated and run along different channels. In contrast
under reward crowdfunding, finance and marketing run along the same channel: the
crowdfunding platform.
Although this fundamental perspective is correct if one views reward crowdfund-
ing as an exclusive alternative to specialized venture capitalists, we emphasize that
crowdfunding and venture capital financing are not mutually exclusive. On the con-
trary, we view the two forms as highly complementary. In line with Diamond (1984),
we see the advantage of venture capitalists (or banks) in reducing the moral hazard
problem, which in terms of the paper’s model implies a reduction in α. In contrast,
the strength of crowdfunding lies in learning about the economic value of the project.
Because the analysis of a fully-fledged model which combines venture capital-
ists and crowdfunding lies outside the scope of the current paper, we just mention
that we see no reason why a venture capitalist may not use crowdfunding to learn
about demand or why after a successful crowdfunding campaign an entrepreneur
may not approach a venture capitalist. Indeed, Dingman (2013) reports that exactly
this occurred in the case of the Pebble Smart Watch. Venture capitalist decided to
support the entrepreneur’s project only after a successful crowdfunding campaign
27In contrast, “investment-based crowdfunding” upholds the traditional separation between fi-
nance and marketing, because the consumers and the crowd-investors are typically not the same
economic agents.
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on Kickstarter. Quoting a managing partner of a venture capitalist firm: “What
venture capital always wants is to get validation, and with Kickstarter, he [i.e. the
entrepreneur] could prove there was a market.”
7 Conclusion
Crowdfunding provides the innovation that, already before the product is developed,
an entrepreneur can write contracts with her potential consumers. In the presence
of demand uncertainty, this enables entrepreneurs to use crowdfunding as a tool that
screens for valuable projects. Our formal analysis confirms that optimal mechanisms
do take on this particular role of screening. Current all-or-nothing reward crowdfund-
ing schemes such as Kickstarter reflect the main features of these optimal mechanisms.
In particular, they are consistent with the idea that these schemes are used to improve
the selection of entrepreneurial projects. This promotes social welfare.
Our analysis further shows that, despite the effectiveness of reward crowdfunding
schemes in screening for project value, their susceptibility to entrepreneurial moral
hazard may prevent the implementation of fully efficient outcomes. In the presence of
moral hazard, crowdfunding can attain fully efficient outcomes only if the project’s ex
ante expected gross return exceeds its ex ante expected investment costs by a markup
whose size reflects the severeness of the moral hazard problem. Constrained efficient
mechanisms exhibit underinvestment, but still reflect crucial features of current all-
or-nothing reward crowdfunding schemes.
Because crowdfunding schemes by themselves are, in the presence of moral haz-
ard, unable to attain efficiency in general, we see them as complements rather than
substitutes for traditional venture capital. We therefore expect a convergence of the
two financing forms. Venture capitalists provide their economic benefit in reducing
moral hazard. Crowdfunding platforms provide their economic benefit in learning
about the project’s value. Current policy measures such as the US JOBS Act and
its implementation in SEC (2015) will make such mixed forms of crowdfunding and
more traditional venture capitalism easier to develop and take advantage of their
respective strengths. The website of the crowdfunding platform Rockethub already
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explicitly mentions this possible effect of the JOBS Act.28
Finally, in order to focus on the trade-off between demand uncertainty and en-
trepreneurial moral hazard — which we view as two fundamental first order effects in
crowdfunding — our analysis necessarily abstracts from many other relevant aspects
of crowdfunding. For instance, we do not address the role of crowdfunders in promot-
ing the product, the dynamics in pledging behavior in actual crowdfunding schemes,
or consumer uncertainty about the quality of the product unrelated to moral haz-
ard. Apart from pointing out that crowdfunding and external capital provision in the
form of venture capital are complements, we also do not provide a formal analysis of
the interaction between external financing and reward crowdfunding. We moreover
do not address possible issues concerning the platform’s commitment to enforce the
mechanism honestly. Since the platform is a long-term player we conjecture that
its honesty can be uphold by well-known reputational arguments in repeated games
(see Strausz, 2005). This however requires payments to the platform, another aspect
we do not touch upon. In addition, we consider entrepreneurs, who produce a pure
private good without any network effects or other externalities between consumers.
Even though we consider all these issues important and relevant, they lie outside the
scope of the current investigation.




This appendix collects the formal proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1: Follows directly from the text Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Let 1n denote the vector (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn. Since n̄ =
I/(1 − c) = n − 1/2, it follows V 1 = {1n} and V 0 = V \V 1 so that the efficient
output schedule x∗(v) exhibits x∗0(v) = x
∗
i (v) = 0 for v 6= 1n, and x∗0(v) = x∗i (v) = 1
for v = 1n. We show, by contradiction, that a feasible direct mechanism γ∗ that
implements x∗(v) does not exist.
For suppose to the contrary that such a direct mechanism does exist, then there
exists a transfer schedule t so that the direct mechanism γ∗ = (x∗, t) is feasible. Since
x∗0(v) = 1 implies v = 1
n, it follows that T a is a singleton and for all T a ∈ T a, it
holds V (T a) = {1n}. Consequently, p(1n|T a) = 1 and π(v|T a) = 0 for all v 6= 1n.




n)p(1n) ≥ Ip(1n). (24)
Since x0(1




n)p(1n) ≥ Ip(1n). (25)
Note further that the second inequality in (3) for each v 6= 1n implies
n∑
i=1
tai (v) + t
p
i (v) ≥ 0 (26)




(tai (v) + t
p
i (v))π(v) ≥ 0 (27)




(tai (v) + t
p
i (v))π(v) ≥ 2Ip(1n) = (2n− 1)p(1n), (28)
where the equality uses I = n− 1/2.
We now show that (28) contradicts (9). First note that (9) for vi = 0 implies after
a multiplication by pi(0) for each i∑
v−i∈V−i
(tai (0, v−i) + t
p
i (0, v−i))p(0, v−i) ≤ 0. (29)
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(tai (0, v−i) + t
p
i (0, v−i))p(0, v−i) ≤ 0. (30)
Likewise, since Xi(1) = pi(1
n−1), (9) for vi = 1 implies after a multiplication with
pi(1) and using pi(1) = p(1, v−i) that for each i∑
v−i∈V−i
(tai (1, v−i) + t
p
i (1, v−i))p(1, v−i) ≤ p(1n). (31)




(tai (1, v−i) + t
p
i (1, v−i))p(1, v−i) ≤ p(1n)n. (32)




(tai (v) + t
p
i (v))π(v) ≤ p(1n)n. (33)
But since 2n− 1 > n, this contradicts (28). Q.E.D.






Feasibility of γ̄ means x̄(v) satisfies (3) for all v ∈ V , and therefore K̄(v) ≥ 0 for
all v ∈ V . For any state v, let n̄(v) ≡
∑
i x̄i(v) represent, for a given v, the total
number of consumers with xi = 1. For any state v with x̄0(v) = 0, define t̂
a
i (v) ≡ 0 and
t̂pi (v) ≡ t̄ai (v)+ t̄
p
i (v). For x̄0(v) = 1 define t̂
a
i (v) ≡ t̄ai (v)− x̄i(v)K̄(v)/n̄(v) and t̂
p
i (v) ≡
t̄pi (v)+x̄i(v)K̄(v)/n̄(v). Since x̄ is feasible and development efficient, it holds n̄(v) > 0
if and only if x̄0(v) = 1. Hence, the transformed transfer schedule t̂ is well-defined. By
construction, we have t̂ai (v) + t̂
p
i (v) = t̄
a
i (v) + t̄
p




i (v) = 0 for any












i (v)− K̄(v) = I
for any v with x̄0(v) = 1. Hence, the allocation (t̂(v), x̄(v)) satisfies (12). Because
the allocation (t̄(v), x̄(v)) is development feasible, also the allocation (t̂(v), x̄(v)) is
development feasible. Moreover, from t̂ai (v) + t̂
p
i (v) = t̄
a
i (v) + t̄
p
i (v) it follows that
(t̂, x̄) is also budget-feasible, truthful, and individual rational, given that (t̄, x̄) is so
by assumption.
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In order to show that (t̂, x̄) is feasible, it only remains to show that it is obedient,
i.e., satisfies (8). To show this, define for T̄ a ∈ T̄ a




Now since, γ̄ = (t̄, x̄) is obedient by assumption, (8) holds for any T̄ a ∈ T̄ a. Given








π̄(v|T̄ a)(t̄pi (v)− cx̄i(v) + t̄ai (v))− I ≥ αT̄ a, for all T̄ a ∈ T̄ a. (34)
From t̂ai (v) + t̂
p
i (v) = t̄
a
i (v) + t̄
p













π̄(v|T̄ a)(t̂pi (v)− cx̄i(v)) ≥ αT̄ a, for all T̄ a ∈ T̄ a. (36)





π̄(v|T̄ a)(t̂pi (v)− cx̄i(v)) ≥ αI, for all T̄ a ∈ T̄ a. (37)





π̄(v|T̄ a)P̄ (T̄ a)(t̂pi (v)− cx̄i(v)) ≥ αI · P̄ (T̄ a), for all T̄ a ∈ T̄ a. (38)
By definition of π̄(v|T̄ a), we have π̄(v|T̄ a)P̄ (T̄ a) = π(v)1v∈V̄ (T̄a), where 1A is the
indicator function which is 1 if the statement A is true and 0 otherwise. Thus we







i (v)− cx̄i(v)) ≥ αI · P̄ (T̄ a), for all T̄ a ∈ T̄ a. (39)









i (v)− cx̄i(v)) ≥
∑
T̄a∈T̄ a
αI · P̄ (T̄ a). (40)
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Denoting by V̂ (·) and P̂ (·) under the mechanism γ̂ the corresponding sets V̄ (·) and
probabilities P̄ (·) under the mechanism γ̄, we can, after noting that T̂ a = {I} and






i (v)− cx̄i(v)) ≥ αI · P̄ (∪T̄a∈T̄ aT̄ a), (41)









(t̂pi (v)− cx̄i(v)) ≥ αI · P̂ (I), (42)





π̂(v|T̂ a)(t̂pi (v)− cx̄i(v))− T̂ a − I ≥ αI · P̂ (I), for all T̂ a ∈ T̂ a. (43)
Hence, γ̂ satisfies (8) so that γ̂ = (t̂, x̄) is obedient. To complete the proof note that
since t̂ai (v) + t̂
p
i (v) = t̄
a
i (v) + t̄
p
i (v), the feasible direct mechanism γ̂ = (t̂, x̄) is payoff
equivalent to original mechanism γ̄ = (t̄, x̄). Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 3: The first statement follows because the incentive constraint (7)
for vi = 1, and the individual rationality (9) of a consumer with value v = 0 imply
the individual rationality (9) for vi = 1. That is, 1 ·Xi(1)−Ti(1) ≥ 1 ·Xi(0)−Ti(0) ≥
0 ·Xi(0)− Ti(0) ≥ 0.
To see xi(0, v−i) = 0, note that if not, then xi(0, v−i) = 1. But then lowering it
to 0 raises the objective (15) by p(0, v−i)c. This change is feasible, because it keeps
constraints (7) for vi = 0, (9), and (12) unaffected, while relaxing the constraints (7)
for vi = 1, (13), and (14). The statement Xi(0) = 0 then follows as a corollary.
To see Ti(0) = 0, note that (9) implies Ti(0) ≤ 0. But if Ti(0) < 0, then raising
each tpi (0, v−i) and t
p
i (1, v−i) by Ti(0)/πi(v−i) for each v−i ∈ V−i leads to a feasible
mechanism with Ti(0) = 0 and the same value for the objective (15). The adapted
mechanism is feasible since the change does not affect (7) and (12), and, by con-
struction, satisfies (9) for vi = 0 so that, by the first argument of this lemma, it also
satisfies (9) for vi = 1. The raises in t
p
i (v) further relaxes (13) and (14). Consequently,
there is no loss of generality in assuming that, at the optimum, Ti(0) = 0.
To see Ti(1) = Xi(1), note that (7) for vi = 1 together with Xi(0) = Ti(0) = 0
imply Ti(1) ≤ Xi(1). But if Ti(1) < Xi(1), then we can raise all tpi (1, v−i) by ε > 0
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such that Ti(1) = Xi(1). The increase is feasible and does not affect the objective
(15). To see that the change is feasible, note that it relaxes constraint (7) for vi = 0
and, by construction, satisfies (7) for vi = 1. It further does not affect (9) for vi = 0
and, by the first part of the lemma, the constraint (9) for vi = 1 is redundant. It also
does not affect (12), while relaxing (13) and (14). Consequently, there is no loss of
generality in assuming that, at the optimum, Ti(1) = Xi(1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Recalling that π∗ =
∑
v∈V 1 π(v), define
π∗(v) ≡
 π(v)/π∗ if x∗0(v) = 1;0 otherwise,




π∗(v)vi(1− c) ≥ (1 + α)I. (44)
We first prove that under condition (44) the first best is implementable by con-
structing a transfer schedule t̂ such that the direct mechanism γ∗ = (t̂, x∗) is feasible
and therefore implements x∗. For any v such that x∗0(v) = 0, set t̂
a
i (v) = t̂
p
i (v) = 0.





i (v) > 0 represents the effi-




t̂pi (v) = x
∗
i (v)(1− I/x̄∗(v)).
We show that the resulting mechanism γ∗ = (t̂, x∗) is direct and feasible. More
specifically, for each v ∈ V the allocation γ∗(v) satisfies (3) so that γ∗ is direct
(it trivially satisfies (4), since x∗ does so by construction). Moreover, the direct
mechanism γ∗ satisfies (7), (8), and (9) for each v ∈ V .

















i (v), since x
∗
i (v) = 0 for all i whenever x
∗
0(v) = 0.

































i vi ≥ I +
∑












i cvi. Hence, γ(v) ∈ A for all v so that the mechanism γ∗ is direct.
29x̄∗(v) is greater than 0, since x∗0(v) = 1 and x
∗ is development-efficient.
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To show (7) and (9) note that x∗i (0) = 0 implies X
∗
i (0) = 0 and, by construction
of t̂, also T ∗i (0) = 0. Moreover, X
∗
i (1) ≥ 0 and T ∗i (1) ≥ 0. For vi = 0, it therefore
follows viX
∗
i (vi) − T ∗i (vi) = 0 ·X∗i (0) − T ∗i (0) = 0 ≤ −T ∗i (1) = 0 ·X∗1 (1) − T ∗i (1) so
that (7) and (9) are satisfied for vi = 0. To see that they are also satisfied for vi = 1,





i (1, v−i) − t̂ai (1, v−i) − t̂
p
i (1, v−i)] = 0 =
1 ·X∗i (0)− T ∗i (0).
Finally, to show (8), first note that for γ∗ we have T ∗ = {I} and π(v|I) = π∗(v)


























π∗(v)vi(1− c)− I ≥ αI, (46)
where the inequality uses (44).




π∗(v)vi(1− c) < (1 + α)I, (47)
then there does not exist a transfer schedule t̂ such that the direct mechanism γ =
(t̂, x∗) is feasible. In particular, we show there does not exist a transfer schedule t̂
such that (t̂, x∗) satisfies (16)-(22).
For the efficient output schedule x∗ it holds V 1 = {v|x∗0(v) = 1} and V 0 =
{v|x∗0(v) = 0} and V = V 1 ∪ V 0.





i (v) + t
p
i (v) ≥ 0. Multiplying by π(v) and summing up over all v




π(v)[tai (v) + t
p
i (v)] ≥ 0 (48)




i (v) = I. Multiplying by π(v) and summing up over







π(v)I = π∗I (49)
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Since (19) implies T a = {I}, it follows that π∗ · π(v|I) = π(v) for v ∈ V 1 and














π(v)[tai (v) + t
p










π(v)[tai (v) + t
p






Since x∗i (v) = vi for v ∈ V 1 and x∗i (v) = 0 for v ∈ V 0, multiplying (47) by π∗ and
rearranging terms yields





























i (1, v−i) + t
p







i (1, v−i). (55)






i (0, v−i) + t
p







i (0, v−i), (56)
because x∗i (0, v−i) = 0.












but this contradicts (54). Hence, under (47) there does not exist a direct mechanism
γ = (t, x∗) that satisfies (16)-(22) and, hence, x∗ is not implementable. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3: Consider a maximizer γ̄ = (t̄, x̄) of problem P .
To show that it satisfies the first statement, note that (22) directly implies that for
vi = 0 it holds xi(vi, v−i) = vi. So it is left to prove x
sb
0 (1, v−i) = 1⇒ x̄i(1, v−i) = 1.
Suppose to the contrary that there exists some v̄ ∈ V with some v̄i = 1 so that
x̄0(v̄) = 1 and x̄i(1, v̄−i) = 0. Then by raising both x̄i(1, v̄−i) and the corresponding
t̄pi (1, v̄−i) by 1, the objective (15) is raised by p(1, v̄−i)(1−c) > 0, while the constraints
(16), (18),(19),(21), and (22) are unaffected, and (17) and (20) are relaxed.
To show the second statement, suppose to the contrary that γ̄ = (t̄, x̄) exhibits
x̄0(v̄) = 1, while x
∗
0(v̄) = 0 for some v̄ = (v̄1, . . . , v̄n). Define I
1 = {i|x̄i(v̄) = 1}
as the set of consumers who receive the good under γ̄ and the value realization v̄.
Since γ̄ is, by assumption, a maximizer of P , it must hold that I1 is non-empty
and, due to (22), for all i ∈ I1 it holds vi = 1. But since x∗0(v) = 0, it follows∑
i∈I1 v̄i(1−c) ≤
∑
i v̄i(1−c) < I. Now consider an alternative mechanism γ̂ = (t̂, x̂)
that is identical to γ̄ except that x̂0(v̄) = x̂i(v̄) = 0 and for all i ∈ I1 it exhibits
x̂i(v̄) = 0, t̂
p
i (v̄) = t̄
p
i (v̄)− c, and t̂ai (v̄) = t̄ai (v̄)−1+ c. First note that a comparison of
the objective (15) evaluated at γ̂ and γ̄ yields a difference of p(v̄)[I −
∑
i∈I1(1− c)],
which is positive. Hence, γ̄ is not a solution to P if γ̂ is feasible. In order to see that
γ̂ is feasible, we verify that it satisfies (3), (4), (7), (8), and (9) using that γ̄ satisfies
these constraints by assumption.








i (v̄) − 1 + c) +∑
i 6∈I1 t̄
a
i (v̄) ≥ I −
∑
i∈I1(1 − c) ≥ 0 = Ix̂0(v̄), where the first inequality follows
because γ̄ satisfies (3) and the second inequality was already established above.















i (v̄) + t̄
p




i∈I1 1 = I −
∑
i∈I1(1− c) ≥
0 = Ix̂0(v̄) + c
∑
i x̂i(v̄), where the first inequality follows because γ̄ satisfies (3).
Noting that, because γ̄ satisfies (4), it trivially follows that also γ̂ satisfies (4), we
continue to verify (7) and (9). Note that, by construction, x̂i(v̄) − t̂ai (v̄) − t̂
p
i (v̄) =
x̄i(v̄)− t̄ai (v̄)− t̄
p
i (v̄) so that X̂i(vi)− T̂i(vi) = X̄i(vi)− T̄i(vi). Because γ̄ satisfies (7)
and (9), therefore, also γ̂.
Finally, to verify (8) note that for γ̄ we have T a = {I} so that this is also













































































i (v)− cx̄i(v)) ≥ αI.
To show the proposition’s third statement, consider a mechanism γ̄ = (x̄, t̄) which
satisfies (16)-(22) and there is a v̄ such that x̄0(v̄) = 0, while
∑
i v̄i > (1+α)I/(1−c).
We show that γ̄ is not a solution to P , because there exists a (x̂, t̂) that also satisfies
(16)-(22) but yields a strictly higher surplus that γ̄. More specifically, let (x̂, t̂) be
identical to (x̄, t̄) except that x̂i(v̄) = v̄i, t̂
a
i (v̄) = t̄
a
i (v̄) + v̄i · I/
∑
j v̄j, and t̂
p
i (v̂) =
t̃pi (v̂) + v̄i(1− I/
∑
j v̄j).
Note first that the difference in surplus between (x̂, t̂) and (x̄, t̄) is p(v̄)[(1 −
c)
∑
j vj − I] > 0. It remains to be checked that (x̂, t̂) satisfies (16)-(22). That
it satisfies (16), (18), (21), and (22) follows directly, because (x̄, t̄) satisfies these
constraints by assumption and (x̂, t̂) is a transformation of (x̄, t̄) which preserves
them.
Since (19) holds for (x̄, t̄), (x̂, t̂) trivially satisfies it for all v 6= v̂. It, however, also










i v̄i · I/
∑
j v̄j = Ix̄0(v̄) + I = I = Ix̂0(v̄).

















i x̂i(v̄)c, where the first inequality
uses that (x̄, t̄) satisfies (20), and the second inequality follows from the proposition’s
presumption that
∑
j v̄j > (1 + α)I/(1− c), as this implies c < 1− I/
∑
j v̄j.












i (v̄)− cx̂i(v̄)] =∑
i[t̄
p
i (v̄) + v̄i(1− I/
∑




j v̄j − c) =
∑
i v̄i(1− c)− I > αI,
where the first inequality uses that (x̄, t̄) satisfies (20), and the final inequality uses
the proposition’s presumption that
∑
i v̄i > (1 + α)I/(1− c).
Since (x̄, t̄) satisfies (17), the definition of π(v|I) implies that it holds∑
{v:x̄0(v)=1}













But since {v : x̂0(v) = 1} = {v : x̄0(v) = 1} ∪ {v̄}, this is equivalent to∑
{v:x̂0(v)=1}




which is equivalent to saying that (x̂, t̂) satisfies (17).
To show the proposition’s last statement, suppose that, to the contrary, there
exists a solution γ̄ = (x̄, t̄) of problem P for which such a T does not exist. In




j v̂j such that




j v̂j, we can find a bijective correspondence
k : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} such that v̂j = 1 implies v̄k(j) = 1. Fix the correspondence
k and its inverse k−1 and define the mechanism γ̂ = (x̂, t̂) by x̂0(v) = x̄0(v) for
all v 6= v̂, v̄, x̂0(v̄) = 1 and x̂0(v̂) = 0, and x̂i(v) = x̄k−1(i)(v), t̂ai (v) = t̄ak−1(i)(v),
t̂pi (v) = t̄
p
k−1(i)(v). Since γ̄ satisfies by assumption all constraints (16)-(22) of problem





mechanism γ̂ exhibits at least one i such that v̄i = 1 and xi(v̄) = 0. By the first
statement of this proposition, γ̂ is not optimal, since there exists a feasible γ̃ which
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